Sydney-Hobart - Report Findings

The Cruising Yacht Club of Australia released the Report, Findings and Recommendations of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race Review Committee - and announced that it had already made substantial progress towards implementing the majority of the recommendations. The Review Committee's Report says "no one cause can be identified as being responsible" for the fleet becoming involved in multiple incidents on December 27 and 28, 1998 as the 115 yachts headed into Bass Strait.

Review Committee chairman, CYCA Past Commodore Peter Bush, in his executive summary, says: "As a result, there is no single change that can be identified for the future running of the race that could preclude the repeat of such incidents. However, there is a series of incremental changes, that while on their own may appear of little significance, will together have a substantive and lasting impact on the organisation, running and safety of the event. These changes include a range of issues such as administration (processes and procedures), safety (education and equipment), communications and weather (forecasting and education)."

The CYCA established the Review Committee in the wake of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race in which six yachtsmen died tragically at sea as one of the worst storms in the 54-year history of the 630 nautical mile race battered the 115 boat fleet in Bass Strait. Seven yachts were abandoned, five subsequently sank and, in a major search and rescue operation, 55 crew members were rescued by helicopters and surface vessels.

The Report is the result of almost six months work by a committee of experienced ocean racing yachtsmen, headed by Past Commodore Peter Bush. The Review Committee's Report, Findings and Recommendation, covering 180 pages, plus appendices, has been submitted to the Board of Directors of the CYCA, the Australian Maritime Authority, National and International Yachting Authorities, and to the New South Wales Coroner who will conduct a Coronial Inquest later this year to determine the manner of death of the six sailors that lost their lives.

Summarising the key findings and recommendations, Past Commodore Bush says:

• No one cause can be identified as being responsible for the 1998 Sydney Hobart Yacht race fleet becoming involved in multiple incidents on 27 and 28 December 1998. As a result, there is no single change that can be identified for the future running of the Race that could preclude the repeat of such incidents. However, there is a series of incremental changes, that while on their own may appear of little significance, will together have a substantive and lasting impact on the organisation, running and safety of the event. These changes include a range of issues such as administration (processes and procedures), safety (education and equipment), communications and weather (forecasting and education).
• The Race Committee has the power under the "Racing Rules of Sailing 1997-2000" (RRS) published by the Australian Yachting Federation (AYF) to abandon the race. The Committee did not exercise this power. It was the Committee's view that Rule 4 ("Decision to Race") should remain in each skipper's hands, particularly because of the fact that each yacht was in the best position to evaluate its own circumstances fully in the conditions.
• The competitors, while concerned about the 1998 SHYR itself, and being keen to pursue improvements, generally believe that the rules, safety regulations and safety equipment with which they raced, met their needs in the conditions. From interviews of 28 yachts, it is clear that skippers and crews do not see a single (or several) reason(s) for the incidents occurring and certainly see no basis to apportion blame to any particular group - organisers, Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), Search and Rescue (SAR) authorities etc. Furthermore, they do not see as a result, any need for wide sweeping changes to safety regulations and equipment.
• Yachts that experienced problems or encountered difficulties, and even those that continued racing reported that "exceptional" waves were responsible for inflicting the damage or causing severe knockdowns. These waves were always a minimum of 20% and up to 100% bigger than the prevailing seas and always came from a direction other than the prevailing wave pattern.
• Although the precise location, timing and depth of the low pressure system were not accurately forecast, the key issue relating to the weather was the gap in knowledge between the BOM's forecasts and the way they were understood by the sailors. The Bureau assumed that its forecast winds would be interpreted as being up to 40% more than stated and seas up to 86% bigger. The fleet reported expecting winds and seas to be "as forecast" or a bit stronger/bigger.
• There is no evidence that any particular style or design of boat fared better or worse in the conditions. The age of yacht, age of design, construction method, construction material, high or low stability, heavy or light displacement or rig type were not determining factors. Whether or not a yacht was hit by an extreme wave was a matter of chance.
• The level of crew experience exceeded the requirements prescribed by race authorities and the AYF. However, many crews, despite having high levels of ocean racing experience, were poorly informed on aspects of safety equipment use and search and rescue techniques.
• After the 1993 SHYR, when only 38 out of 104 starters completed the race, the CYCA circulated a questionnaire to competitors. The results found safety equipment was satisfactory, but recommended that a series of actions be taken by the Club. These included the improvement of some safety equipment and the skill level and education of sailors in the use of safety equipment and heavy weather sailing. While some of the issues identified in the survey were addressed and implemented, many of the same issues emerged again during the investigations into the 1998 Race. These particularly relate to training and education. The CYCA should have pursued these issues more rigorously.
• The Committee investigated reports from Sword of Orion of a yacht not responding to distress signals. The Committee has passed full details of the incident to the NSW Coroner and to the Commodore of the CYCA for further investigation.
• One yacht (Business Post Naiad) did not meet eligibility requirements. The CYCA has referred this matter to the NSW State Coroner.
• The manner of death of the six sailors that lost their lives will be determined by the NSW State Coroner at a Coronial Inquest at a date to be announced.

Describing the report as one of the most comprehensive and probably far-reaching investigations ever made by a yacht club into every aspect of conducting a long ocean yacht race, CYCA Commodore Hugo van Kretschmar said today that the recommendations will be reflected in the Notice of Race for the 1999 Telstra Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race.

"The report makes many recommendations to change various aspects of race organisation, preparation of yachts and their equipment, and the required preparedness of crews, and the eligibility of both yachts and crew, " Commodore van Kretschmar said today at the CYCA clubhouse in Sydney's Rushcutters Bay.

Significant changes to be implemented for the 1999 Telstra Sydney to Hobart Race will include:

• Adding a weather forecaster to the Race Control Centre in Hobart to issue specific "layman's" forecasts to the fleet through the Radio Relay Vessel, hopefully including reports from Bass Strait oil rigs.
• Compulsory reporting of strong winds (above 40 knots) and wave heights by competing yachts.
• A compulsory situation assessment and report by the skipper of each yacht when abeam of Green Cape (on the Far South Coast of New South Wales) as to the capability of the boat and crew to continue in the race after acknowledging that the boat has received the latest weather information available at that stage.
• Increase in required experience of the crew, with no crew to be under the age of 18.
• Introduction of qualifying races, with a 200 nautical mile offshore passage by new boats. In New South Wales the qualifying race will be a Cabbage Tree Island Race, in Tasmania the Maria Island Race, in Victoria a Bass Strait Race.
• Compulsory attendance at weather, safety and search and rescue seminars for 30% of the crew of each yacht.
• Compulsory safety equipment to include the more accurate 406 Emergency Position Indicating Beacons (EPIRBs) in place of the present 121.5/243 EPIRBs, plus additional EPIRBs for each liferaft.
• Personal safety equipment to include personal strobes or high density lights and dye markers and a replacement time of seven years for safety harnesses.
• Competing yachts are now required to have an IMS (International Measurement System) certificate to certify stability compliance with International Category 1, whether they race under IMS, IR2000 (previously Channel Handicap System) or PHS (Performance Handicap System).
• The CYCA will apply a more stringent and formal protocol to scrutinise each entry to ensure that stability, seaworthiness and crew experience are complied with.
• Race communications will be improved, including upgrading of radio transmission facilities at the Royal Yacht Club of Tasmania, upgraded of marine radio and satellite telephone equipment aboard the Radio Relay Vessel. Each yacht will also be required to carry a hand held VHF radio as a final resort for communication in a search and rescue situation.

While the Review Committee's report did not uncover any evidence to raise major concern at yacht construction in light of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart, the Offshore Racing Council's Technical Committee will be asked to review the design and construction of decks, hatches and windows.

The Australian Yachting Federation will be asked to review the construction, colour and equipment of life rafts. Explaining the Review Committee's recommendations on search and rescue operations, Committee Chairman Peter Bush said that searching aircraft had had difficulty in separating and identifying the many EPIRBs which had been activated at the height of the storm.

As a result, the Review Committee had recommended, and the CYCA had accepted, that all yachts must have the more precise 406 MHz EPIRBs as compulsory equipment for the 1999 Sydney to Hobart. One additional EPIRB must be carried for each liferaft, either packed or stowed on board.

Commenting on the Report, CYCA Commodore Hugo van Kretschmar said: "The Club is committed to ensuring that all of the Review Committee's recommendations are considered fully, referred to appropriate third parties and authorities, implemented - to the extent we are able to do so - and administered rigorously. In fact, the majority of the recommendations have already been included in the Notice of Race for the 1999 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race. Whilst it would be unreasonable to believe that these recommended changes (or anything else for that matter) could ensure the ultimate safety of every participant in future Sydney to Hobart races - there is no doubt that the safety of all competitors in future events will be improved as a result."

On race management, the Commodore said the CYCA Sailing Office was in process of producing a Race Manual and a Crisis Management Plan.

Complete copies of the Report of the 1998 Sydney Hobart Review Committee are available in book form for a fee of $20.00 from the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia, New Beach Board, Darling Point, NSW 2027, Telephone: (02) 9363 9731, fax (02) 9363 9745. -- Peter Campbell